For over two decades, researchers have provided evidence that the yield curve, specifically the spread between long-and short-term interest rates, contains useful information for signaling future recessions. Despite these findings, forecasters appear to have generally placed too little weight on the yield spread when projecting declines in the aggregate economy. Indeed, we show that professional forecasters appear worse at predicting recessions a few quarters ahead than a simple real-time forecasting model that is based on the yield spread. This relative forecast power of the yield curve remains a puzzle.
Introduction
The word "recession" conjures a variety of fears-for workers who suffer job losses, for investors who endure asset price declines, for entrepreneurs who risk bankruptcy. Recessions are periods of greater dislocation and anxiety, higher unemployment and suicide rates, and lower output and profits. In the United States, recessions have become less frequent and less severe in the past two decades; however, nonrecessionary episodes have also become more stable, so in relative terms, as the market sensitivity in the epigraph suggests, recessions appear to many to be as perilous as before. Therefore, any ability to predict recessions remains highly profitable to investors and very useful to policymakers and other economic agents. Accordingly, there remains a keen and widespread interest in predicting recessions, and our paper examines what economic forecasters know about the likely occurrence of a recession and, most importantly, when do they know it.
Our analysis focuses on two divergent strands in the recession prediction literature. First, it is common wisdom that economists are not very good at forecasting recessions. For example, Zarnowitz and Braun (1993) showed that economic forecasters made their largest prediction errors during recessions, and Rudebusch (1989, 1991a,b) reach a pessimistic assessment of the ability of the well-known index of leading indicators to provide useful signals of future recessions. The second strand of the literature comes to a very different conclusion about the predictability of recessions, namely, that the slope of the yield curve, that is, the spread between long-and short-term interest rates, is useful in forecasting real gross domestic product (GDP) growth and recessions. The predictive power of the yield spread for real activity was demonstrated by Harvey (1989) , Stock and Watson (1989) , and Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) .
The ability of the yield spread to predict recessions has been most recently described by Dotsey (1998) , Estrella and Mishkin (1998) , Estrella (2005) , Chauvet and Potter (2005) , Ang, Piazzesi, and Wei (2006) , and Wright (2006) .
In this paper, we examine the apparent contradiction between these two strands of the reces-1 sion prediction literature. We provide new evidence on this issue by examining the information content of probability forecasts provided by participants in the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) and compare these forecasts to real-time recession predictions based on the yield curve spread. As discussed in Croushore (1993) , SPF forecasts of GDP growth and inflation have been found to perform well in forecast evaluation exercises. The SPF also asks panelists to estimate the probabilities that real GDP will decline in the quarter in which the survey is taken and in each of the following four quarters. These data have two advantages as real-time recession forecasts. First, unlike other surveys that occasionally ask questions on recession probabilities (e.g., the Blue Chip survey), the SPF has asked these questions each quarter for nearly 40 years, providing a long time series of real-time recession forecasts. Second, these forecasts should incorporate all information available to professional forecasters and therefore provide better forecasts of recessions than implied by the leading indicators and other forecasting methods that have been found wanting in past forecast evaluations. Indeed, Lahiri and Wang (2006) analyzed the forecast performance of the SPF probability forecasts for the current and the next quarter and found them to contain predictive power. But, those authors did not compare these forecasts to those from other models or look at forecast horizons beyond one quarter.
We find that the SPF probability forecasts are somewhat better at forecasting recessions in the current quarter than forecasts from a simple probit model using the yield spread; however, this difference is not statistically significant at the 5% level. Moreover, the SPF's relative predictive power deteriorates at forecast horizons of one quarter or more. These findings are robust to alternative measures of forecast performance. Evidently, the pessimistic assessment of the ability of economists to forecast recessions holds for the SPF probability forecasts as well.
The forecasts from the yield spread model, based on real-time estimates, are significantly more accurate than the SPF probability forecasts for forecast horizons of three and four quarters.
At shorter horizons, the yield curve spread model is not useful at predicting recessions and its forecast accuracy is statistically indistinguishable from those of the SPF. This finding that the simple yield curve spread model dominates the SPF at longer horizons is a puzzle for the hypothesis that forecasters incorporate all available information (as discussed by Fernald and Trehan 2006) . We show that SPF forecasts of real GDP growth exhibit the same pattern, with forecast errors highly correlated with the lagged yield spread.
We find that the puzzling dominance of the yield curve model over the SPF forecasts has endured, suggesting that economists in the survey failed to "learn" about the usefulness of the yield spread for forecasting recessions. In particular, the yield curve model dominates the SPF forecasts in a sample covering only the past 20 years. This finding is especially puzzling, because the usefulness of the yield curve spread to predict output growth and recessions received widespread attention among economists in the late 1980s. Indeed, in our analysis, we use a very simple real-time model identical to that proposed by Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) , which practitioners should have been aware of for most of the past 20 years. The simple yield curve model still dominates the SPF forecasts at horizons of three and four quarters in most cases for this shorter sample. Even after the predictive power of the yield curve had been well publicized, it appears that SPF participants did not incorporate all of the available yield curve information into their forecasts of economic activity.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we provide a simple definition of recessions in terms of real GDP growth. In Section 3, we describe a variety of alternative real-time probability forecasts for these GDP-based recessions. In Section 4, we assess the accuracy of these forecasts. In Section 5, we examine whether the evidence on the relative forecast accuracy has changed over time, and we conclude with some speculation about possible resolutions to the puzzle of the enduring relative power of the yield curve for predicting recessions.
Defining Recessions
As a first step, it is necessary to define what constitutes a "recession." The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), which has been dating recessions for almost 80 years, provides the most widely accepted definition of a recession (NBER 2003) :
A recession is a significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales. A recession begins just after the economy reaches a peak of activity and ends as the economy reaches its trough. Between trough and peak, the economy is in an expansion.
Thus, in determining the dates of business cycle peaks and troughs, the NBER does not rely on any single macroeconomic indicator, but instead examines a large collection of variables. These individual series have idiosyncratic movements but also display substantial comovement and correlation, and the NBER selects the overall business cycle peak and trough months to best capture the general consensus among the various series of the high and low points in economic activity. For detailed discussion of the NBER methodology, see Rudebusch (1992, 1996) . Based on this methodology, the NBER publishes a historical chronology of the monthly dates of past business cycle peaks and troughs, which delineate recessions and expansions. (For a modern dynamic factor approach for measuring economic activity, see Aruoba, Diebold, and Scotti, 2008.) The NBER business cycle dating methodology requires substantial judgment in its application, and the resulting chronology is not without measurement error. Diebold and Rudebusch (1992) describe some of the uncertainty about the precise monthly dating of the general turns in business activity; however, even if one accepts the NBER dates of cyclical peaks and troughs as stated, there remains some ambiguity about when a recession starts and ends. Specifically, the peak and trough months could be classified as the first month of a recession and the first month of an expansion, respectively, or as the last month of an expansion and the last month of a recession, respectively. The latter convention, in which the recession starts in the month following the peak month and ends on the date of the subsequent trough month, is the more common one (e.g., Diebold and Rudebusch 1989) . (In contrast, the NBER's view is that the day when the economy turns around is contained within the peak or trough month, so those months are blends of both recession and expansion phases.) A further complication arises from the translation of the monthly dates into designations of peaks and troughs at a quarterly frequency, which we employ in our analysis because the SPF is quarterly. Such a translation can be done in a variety of ways, and we follow the most common convention (e.g., Estrella and Trubin 2006) and assume that a recession starts in the quarter that directly follows the quarter containing the peak month and that it ends in the quarter containing the trough month. Our resulting chronology of quarterly NBER recessions and expansions is represented by a binary variable, with a one for a recession quarter and a zero otherwise, which will be denoted as RN BER t . See the web appendix to this article for further details of this variable. We also obtained similar dating of recessions using an alternative convention in which a recession quarter was defined to contain two or more recession months or using the convention in Wright (2006) , in which both the peak quarter and trough quarter were counted as recession quarters, but we do not report those results here.
For our analysis, we employ a simple rule that links declines in real GDP to recessions.
As noted by the NBER (2003): "The NBER considers real GDP to be the single measure 4 that comes closest to capturing what it means by 'aggregate economic activity.' The [NBER] therefore places considerable weight on real GDP and other output measures." Of course, as in any real-time analysis, the issue of which vintage of data to use is important, and we consider three different data series for real GDP growth. The first series is the so-called "first-final" data which is released about three months after the end of each quarter. This is our preferred real-time measure of GDP. It incorporates a great deal of information about expenditures and is a reasonably accurate measure of GDP based on the methodology in place at the time. The second is the latest revised estimates available as of February 2007. These data have been subject to multiple revisions and, importantly, incorporate significant changes in methodology, making comparison of real-time forecasts to revised data problematic. The third is the "advance" data, which is released about one month after the end of the quarter. At the time of publication of these data, several important source data are still unavailable, making these estimates subject to greater measurement error than the "first-final" estimates. See the web appendix to this article for further details on these data.
A straightforward rule for defining recessions that works quite well is what we dub the "R1 rule," which simply defines any single quarter of negative real GDP growth as a recession quarter. The associated binary variable of recession quarters is denoted as R1 t . A value of one indicates that the growth rate of real GDP was negative in that quarter, otherwise the value is zero. Applied to first-final data, the R1 rule produces 14 recession quarters that match one of the 21 NBER recession quarters, with only seven missed calls of recession. The R1 rule also produces five false calls of recession (including one by a whisker in 1978:Q1). Therefore, there are 12 total quarters of incorrect signals and the mix of missed calls is reasonably balanced. The R1 rule has advantages in terms of simplicity and its direct connection to the survey questions in the SPF (described below), and we therefore use it for our analysis for the remainder of the paper.
For comparison, we also consider the recession dates that one obtains by applying what we call the "R2 rule," which defines a recession as occurring if there are two consecutive quarters of negative real GDP growth. In particular, we say that a quarter is in an R2 recession if real GDP falls in that quarter and if either (or both) the previous and following quarters post negative real GDP growth as well. This definition of a recession is often mentioned in the media, but in practice, it performs rather poorly as a proxy for NBER recession dates. Using any of the three vintages of data, the R2 rule appears too stringent a criterion to provide a good match to the NBER business-cycle dating methodology. For example, applying the R2 rule to the first-final data produces only ten recession quarters that match one of the 21 NBER recession quarters, with 11 quarters of missed recession signals. Perhaps most problematic, the R2 rule using the first-final data completely misses the 1980 and 2001 NBER recessions. The R2 rule produces only two false calls of recession quarters relative to the NBER definition (in 1969 and 1991) .
Overall then, the R2 rule gives a total of 13 quarters of incorrect recession signals. See the web appendix to this article for detailed R1 and R2 chronologies.
Recession Probability Forecasts
In this section, we describe various alternative real-time probability forecasts of R1 recession quarters using the first-final data. These are based on information from the SPF or from a probit model using the yield curve slope as an explanatory variable. In the next section, we will provide a formal statistical examination of their relative accuracy.
SPF reported probability forecasts
Every quarter since the fourth quarter of 1968, the SPF has asked its participants to provide estimates of the probability of negative real GDP growth in that quarter as well as probabilities of negative growth in the current quarter and each of the next four quarters. The survey typically was due by the middle of the second month of the quarter (in recent years, the due date has been moved up a week, to around the 7th of the second month of the quarter). The number of respondents has varied over time, with a median of about 34. For a detailed discussion of the SPF, see Croushore (1993) . There are four missing observations for the four-quarter-ahead probability forecasts, with the final one occurring during the survey taken in the third quarter of 1974. Because we allow for autocorrelation of residuals in the computation of standard errors for our forecast accuracy statistics, the missing observations would require us to drop six years of data from our sample. Instead, we replaced the missing observations on the four-quarter-ahead probability forecasts with the three-quarter-ahead probability forecasts from the same survey.
Our main results also hold if we simply drop the six years of data for the four-quarter-ahead forecasts.
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The wording of the specific survey question is very clear and has changed little over time, and in 2007 it read as follows:
Indicate the probability you would attach to a decline in real GDP (chain-weighted basis, seasonally adjusted) in the next five quarters. Write in a figure that may range from 0 to 100 in each of the cells (100 means a decline in the given quarter is certain, i.e. 100 percent, 0 means there is no chance at all, i.e. 0 percent).
The mean probability forecast for quarter t that was reported in response to this question asked in the survey in quarter t − h is denoted P SP F t|t−h . Importantly, these are direct real-time probability forecasts of what we have termed R1
recessions that require no ex post adjustments or filtering. The solid lines in the five panels of Figure 1 plot these probabilities for the current quarter (h = 0) and for the future four quarters.
(Note that in each panel P SP F t|t−h is plotted in quarter t, regardless of the value of the forecast horizon h.)
For forecasting the current quarter, the SPF participants appear to be able to delineate periods of weak or negative real GDP growth. However, the SPF predictive information regarding R1 recessions quickly erodes as the forecast horizon increases. Certainly for threeand four-quarter-ahead forecasts, it does not appear that the SPF forecasts have much, if any, information.
SPF implied probability forecasts
Our second sequence of recession probability forecasts is derived from the real output forecasts reported in the SPF. We use this measure primarily as a check to see whether the SPF probability forecasts are consistent with the SPF real GDP forecasts. We use the median real GDP forecasts for quarter t from the SPF in quarter t − h and the historical error variances associated with forecasts at various horizons to compute implied recession probabilities P GDP t|t−h . For the purpose of constructing the SPF implied probability forecasts, we have replaced the four missing observations for the four-quarter-ahead real GDP forecasts (mentioned above) with the corresponding three-quarter-ahead forecasts. Excluding these data entirely from the analysis does not affect our results.
Unfortunately, we do not have real-time data on the distributions forecasters placed around their output forecasts. Moreover, we do not have SPF forecasts prior to the fourth quarter of 1968 that we could use to construct estimates of such distributions based on past forecast errors.
Instead, we assume that the distributions around the forecasts follow the normal distribution, with variances set equal to the full-sample variances of SPF real GDP growth forecast errors for each forecast horizon. (There are four missing observations for the four-quarter-ahead real GDP forecasts, with the final one occurring in the first quarter of 1970. These are dropped from the sample in computing the forecast error variances.) Note that because we apply the same forecast error variances to all forecast vintages, these are not true real-time recession probabilities in that they are computed as if forecasters knew the full-sample variances of forecast errors. Still, these probabilities are based on the real-time GDP point forecasts. The resulting forecasts are shown by the dashed lines in Figure 1 .
The differences between the reported SPF recession probabilities and the implied probabilities based on the GDP forecasts are generally small and fairly uniform over time, which suggests that the SPF participants provide GDP point forecasts that are fairly consistent with their reported negative growth probability forecasts. This helps validate the probability forecasts as serious predictions. Furthermore, it suggests that there has been little change in the perceived forecast error volatility over time. Recall that the implied probabilities assume a constant forecast error variance, which is set to its average over the full sample. This appears to be a pretty good estimate. Notably, the differences between the reported and implied probabilities show no clear trend and are not significantly larger or smaller at the beginning or end of the sample. This lack of trend in the conditional volatility may appear a little surprising but is not inconsistent with the well-known "Great Moderation" in the unconditional volatility of real GDP growth over this period (see Campbell, 2007, and Tulip, 2005 , for further discussion). Finally, a comparison of the two time series shows some interesting episodes. In particular, in 1979 and 1980, which was a period of relatively high reported and implied probabilities of negative growth, the SPF participants underestimated that likelihood relative to what was implied by their GDP forecasts. Similarly, during much of the 1990s, the reported probabilities were lower than would be expected based on the GDP forecasts and historical forecast error distributions.
Yield-curve probability forecasts
We now consider forecasts of an R1 recession that are based on the yield spread. Following Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) , we define the yield spread, S t , to be the difference between the yield on a 10-year U.S. Treasury note, i L t , and the yield on a 3-month Treasury bill, i S t :
We construct this yield spread using quarterly averages of the constant-maturity yields for each Treasury security. Our basic yield-curve recession prediction model is a probit of the form:
where the variable R1 t equals one if real GDP growth is negative in quarter t and zero otherwise and N[•] denotes the cumulative normal distribution. The forecast horizon is varied so that h = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4. Note that the yield curve information available for a forecast made at time t − h includes the average spread in quarter t − h − 1. This is consistent with the timing of the information set of the SPF forecasts. Given that yield curve data are not revised and are available immediately, forecasters would have knowledge of the spread in the prior quarter when forming their forecasts in the first month of the quarter. (Note that our timing assumption does differ somewhat from the timing often used in the literature, which typically includes the current term spread in the probit regression. Thus, what we refer to as an n-quarter-ahead forecast, other papers may call an (n + 1)-quarter-ahead forecast.)
Of course, in real time, a forecaster could only estimate the probit over the sample of available past data. We assume that a forecaster reestimates the five probit regressions (one for each forecast horizon) each quarter using the real-time data set available at that time. These are expanding sample (or "recursive") estimates based on a sample that always starts in 1955:Q1 and ends with the most recent observation. Note that because we do not adjust the starting date, the forecasting model does not allow for changes in the underlying structure of the economy over time. The resulting estimated probit model is used to generate the five probability forecasts.
Sequences of real-time probit slope and intercept coefficient estimates are shown in Figure 2 . To simplify the figure, coefficient sequences are only shown for the current quarter and the two-and four-quarter-ahead forecasts, as the omitted one-and three-quarter-ahead sequences are similar.
Consistent with the earlier literature, the estimated coefficients on the yield curve spread are typically highly statistically significant and economically meaningful. It is important to note the stability of these coefficient estimates since the mid-1980s. That is, a forecaster who estimated these probit regressions in 1988 and then used those coefficients going forward would not have been much less accurate than a forecaster who used the sequence of real-time probit coefficient estimates. This result is consistent with other studies that have examined the stability of binary recession prediction models that use the yield spread, and it stands in contrast to the 9 documented instability of (continuous) output growth prediction regressions that use the yield spread (see Estrella, Rodrigues, and Schich 2003) . This later result helps motivate our focus on recession prediction rather than output growth prediction.
Given the real-time coefficient estimates, we define the real-time yield spread R1 recession probability forecast as
whereα t−h andβ t−h are taken from the sequences of real-time estimates. The resulting yield spread recession probability forecasts-based on real-time yield spread data and real-time probit estimates-are shown as solid lines in Figure 3 , with the SPF reported probability forecasts repeated as the dotted line. (Again, the timing of this display plots P Y S t|t−h in quarter t.) A striking result is that the yield curve model appears to do a better job than the SPF probability forecast at predicting when the economy is not going to be in recession for horizons of one or more quarters. At short horizons of zero and one quarter, the SPF forecasts appear to do better at forecasting recessions, while at horizons of three and four quarters, the yield curve model appears to perform better. An explanation for this pattern of predictive power of the yield spread is that the yield spread encapsulates the stance of monetary policy, which affects the economy with a lag of a few quarters. For example, a tightening of monetary policy, say to slow growth and inflation during an economic expansion, typically causes short rates to rise above long rates. As a result, the yield curve model predicts a heightened probability of recession. If the economy actually enters into a recession, the stance of monetary policy may loosen, causing the yield curve to predict expansion just as the economy has entered into a recession. Thus, for short forecast horizons, the data provide mixed signals, with the occurrence of recessions sometimes being contemporaneously associated with loose monetary policy and other times with tight monetary policy. We now turn to a formal evaluation of the relative forecast accuracy of these two sets of forecasts.
Assessing Probability Forecasts
We do not know the objective that SPF participants used in deriving their forecasts. Therefore, in assessing the relative accuracy of the SPF forecasts, we consider several alternative objectives.
In particular, we evaluate the forecasts using both the "first-final" and the "advance" GDP releases. Although the former arguably provides a more accurate measure of economic activity, economic forecasters may have been aiming to match the advance release which they (and their clients) will see first.
Similarly, we do not know the objective function-that is, the penalty they place on forecast "misses"-that forecasters use in constructing their forecasts. We therefore take an agnostic view on this issue and evaluate the forecasts using three common measures of forecast accuracy: the mean absolute error (MAE), the root mean squared error (RMSE), and the log probability score (LPS). These measures can evaluate each type of forecast; for example, for the SPF reported probability forecasts at a horizon of h they are defined as
These three measures evaluate the probability forecasts in terms of the accuracy-the closeness, on average, of the predicted probabilities to the observed recession realizations, as measured by the zero-one R1 t dummy variable denoting the R1 recession quarters.
The measures differ on the relative penalty given to large versus small errors. The first two measures are standard, while the LPS comes from the more specialized literature on evaluating probability forecasts (Diebold and Rudebusch 1989) . The LPS also corresponds to the loss function used in the probit regressions, so it has the advantage of coordinating the in-sample estimation criterion with the out-of-sample loss function for the yield spread forecasts. In this sense, using either the RMSE or MAE loss function handicaps the yield spread's predictive ability relative to the SPF, so our results with those loss functions are conservative assessments of the predictive power of the yield spread. Table 2 reports the same set of statistics using the advance data as a basis for the true values of R1. We start by considering the results for the full sample and return to the subsample results in Section 5.
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4.1 Comparing SPF and yield curve probability forecasts
For the full sample of current-quarter forecasts, the SPF forecast yields smaller forecast errors than the yield spread forecast based on both the first-final and advance data for all three measures (MAE, RMSE, and LPS). For the one-quarter-ahead forecast, the evidence is mixed as to the relative performance of the two forecasts, with the SPF slightly more accurate in four out of six cases based on first-final data, and in only one of six cases using advance data. For forecast horizons of two or more quarters, however, the yield spread forecasts are consistently more accurate than the SPF, based on all three criteria and both data series for R1 (with only one exception out of 36 cases).
To examine the statistical significance of these differences, we apply the Diebold-Mariano (1995) test of relative forecast accuracy. This test is based on the mean accuracy differential (or, more generally, the loss differential) between the two forecasts. In particular, the loss differential at a horizon h for the three accuracy measures are
The Diebold-Mariano (DM) test can be simply based on the t-statistic for the hypothesis of a zero population mean differential, taking into account the fact that the differential time series is not necessarily white noise. (The DM test is not available for an RMSE loss function, so we report the results from the MSE version of the test.) Thus, we compute the DM test by regressing each differential time series on an intercept and testing the significance of that intercept using HAC standard errors, which correct for possible heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the residuals.
There are two complications involved in evaluating the distribution of any DM test statistic.
First, it is important to consider potential finite sample size distortions, especially in small samples. Ideally, we would conduct a monte carlo experiment tailored to the specific circumstances of our application in order to help guide inference. However, the absence of a model underlying the SPF probability forecasts precludes use of such a tool. Instead, we employ the Kiefer, Vogelsang, and Bunzel (2000) method for computing the HAC standard errors. As noted by Kiefer and Vogelsang (2002) , this method is equivalent to using the usual Bartlett kernel of the Newy-West HAC standard error but without truncation (together with the use of nonstandard asymptotic critical values). Importantly, Christensen, et al. (2008) find that, in the DM test context, this method has much better finite sample size properties than other robust estimators. Second, in assessing the distribution of the DM test, the issue of accounting for parameter estimation error also arises, as discussed in detail by Corradi and Swanson (2006) . Again, our
use of non-model-based judgmental SPF forecasts essentially removes such errors as a subject of analysis. In the case of the yield spread probit forecasts, West (1996) shows that when the in-sample objective function is the same as the out-of-sample loss function, which is true for the LPS loss function, parameter estimation error vanishes.
The SPF reported probabilities are never significantly more accurate than the yield spread forecasts at the 5% significance level. This is true for all forecast horizons, for all three criteria, and for both first-final and advance data. The performance of the SPF forecasts relative to the yield spread model is at its best in the case of current-quarter forecasts, but even then the difference is significant at the 10% level only for the LPS criterion using first-final data, and in no case is it significant at the 5% level. These results are consistent with the generally negative assessment of the ability of forecasters to predict recessions found in the literature.
In contrast, the yield spread forecasts are significantly more accurate than the SPF forecasts at three-and four-quarter-ahead forecast horizons. Based on the first-final data, the yield spread forecasts are significantly more accurate than the reported SPF forecasts for these horizons at the 10% level for all three criteria, and are significant at the 5% level in five of six cases. In Tables 1 and 2 , we denote the yield spread probability forecasts that are significantly more accurate than the reported SPF forecasts with a dagger, using the 5% (two-sided) critical value from Kiefer and Vogelsang (2002) . These results are qualitatively the same using advance data.
These findings represent a remarkably strong refutation of the rationality of the SPF probability forecasts at longer forecast horizons.
One reason for the relatively poor performance of the SPF forecasts is that they exhibit a moderate upward bias over the full sample, with a mean forecast error (actual minus forecast) of between -0.06 and -0.04. By comparison, the yield spread forecasts exhibit a much smaller upward bias, with mean forecast errors between -0.03 and 0.00. Still, this bias does not explain all of the advantage of the yield curve model over the SPF forecasts. Economists were also ignoring information from the yield curve in producing their forecasts for real GDP.
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The finding that forecasters have not efficiently used all available information is also apparent from the results of standard rationality tests of the SPF real GDP forecasts, which are reported in for discussion of these measures as well as other forecast attributes, such as calibration and resolution.) However, like the MAE and RMSE, these are symmetrical accuracy measures, weighing these false and missed signals equally, and would likely yield similar conclusions.
As a robustness check, we reexamine the relative performance of the forecasts using asymmetric preferences over forecast errors. The underlying impediment in adopting asymmetric measures is that they require some specificity about why false alarms and missed calls are being treated differently. Such asymmetric weighting requires knowledge of the particular decisionmaking context in which the forecasts are being used. For example, given the uncertain lags in the transmission of monetary policy, a central banker may not attach much if any cost to a false signal that a recession will occur in the second quarter if one actually does occur in the third quarter. In contrast, a market trader may attach a high cost to a false signal with such a one-quarter miss in timing. Obviously, like many other researchers before us, we cannot provide clear guidance on this issue but only highlight it.
For this exercise, we use the asymmetric weighting scheme of Elliot, Komunjer, and Timmermann (2005) and apply it to the MAE and MSE criteria. In the case of the SPF probability forecast, the weights applied to each (absolute or squared) forecast error are given by:
where I(•) is the indicator function, taking the value one when the forecast error is negative (i.e., a recession does not occur) and zero when the forecast error is positive (i.e., a recession does occur). A value of α of 0.5 implies symmetric preferences. As seen in Figure 1 , the currentquarter SPF reported probability forecasts appear to track the occurrences of R1 recessions much better than the yield spread, but perform worse in periods when no recession occurs. This suggests that the relative accuracy of the SPF forecasts may improve with a weighting scheme that places more weight on avoiding missing a recession when one does occur than on avoiding false predictions of recessions. For this, we examined values of α of 0.6 and 0.8.
Our key results about the relative accuracy of SPF and yield spread forecasts are robust to the assumption of asymmetric preferences of this type. Even with a highly asymmetric loss with α = 0.8, the SPF forecasts are never more accurate than the yield spread forecasts at the 5% level. The current-quarter SPF forecasts are more accurate than the yield spread forecasts at the 10% significance level, but only for the first-final data. Based on the MAE criterion, at forecast horizons of three and four quarters, the yield spread forecasts are significantly more accurate than the SPF forecasts at the 5% level. Based on the MSE criterion, the four-quarter-ahead yield spread forecast is significantly more accurate than the SPF forecast at the 10% level. These results hold for both the first-final and advance data. The high relative accuracy of the yield spread forecasts measured using an asymmetric criterion is all the more remarkable given that these forecasts were based on the very different LPS criterion.
15
We regard the result that the simple yield curve model outperforms professional forecasters at forecasting recessions as very puzzling. One possible explanation is that forecasters were unaware of the predictive power of the yield curve for much of our sample, which starts at the end of the 1960s. We therefore reexamine our results using forecast errors from 1988 on.
As mentioned above, the early papers trumpeting the predictive power of the yield curve were already published or widely circulated around the start of this subsample. Therefore, economists by then should have incorporated this information in their forecasts and the puzzling predictive In the post-1987 sample, the yield spread still contains predictive information that appears not to have been taken into account by the SPF participants at horizons of three and four quarters. Based on the first-final data, the yield spread forecasts are significantly more accurate than the SPF forecasts in half of the cases of forecast horizons of three quarters and longer. The results are even stronger using the advance data. The upward bias in forecasts is larger for both the SPF and the yield curve forecasts for this subsample, reflecting the reduced frequency of recessions during this period relative to earlier decades. For horizons of three and four quarters, the smaller mean error of the yield curve model explains much of its better performance over this sample, but it also performs better in quarters when a recession did occur. The rationality tests of SPF GDP forecasts over this subsample, reported in Table 3 , provide some evidence that economists also failed to heed the information in the yield curve in making GDP forecasts.
Specifically, the four-quarter-ahead forecasts fail the rationality test when the yield spread is included in the regression.
The relative value of the yield spread versus the SPF for forecasting recessions in the post-1987 sample can also be illustrated by examining the accuracy of the weighted average probability
where λ is the weight on the real-time SPF reported probability and (1 − λ) is the weight on the real-time probability forecast based on the yield spread. Figure 4 shows the accuracy, for the three different measures, of these weighted average forecasts at horizons of h = 0, 2, 4. For forecasting the current quarter (the solid lines), the optimal weight λ is close to one, so the yield spread adds nothing, but for a four-quarter horizon (the dotted lines), the optimal weight is zero, so the SPF adds nothing. At a forecast horizon of four quarters, it is clear that one of the failings of the SPF reported probabilities is the sustained 20% or so chance of a recession during the long expansions of the past two decades.
Conclusion
As witnessed by the public attention to recent pronouncements of probabilities of recession, there is a great deal of interest in predicting recessions. Nonetheless, economists have a very spotty track record of predicting downturns. One possible explanation is that recessions are simply unpredictable. But, this view is contradicted by evidence that the yield curve provides useful information for forecasting future periods of expansion and contraction. In this paper, we show that the yield curve has significant real-time predictive power for distinguishing between expansions and contractions several quarters out relative to the predictions of professional macroeconomic forecasters. Indeed, we find that a simple model for predicting recessions that uses only real-time yield curve information would have produced better forecasts of recessions at horizons beyond two quarters than the professional forecasters provided. This conclusion remains true during the past 20 years, despite the fact that the yield curve model's usefulness has been widely known since the late 1980s.
There are a number of potential reconciliations for this puzzle. One possibility is that forecasters may have down-weighted the yield curve information because they systematically underestimated the macroeconomic repercussions of changes in the stance of monetary policy as proxied for by shifts in the slope of the yield curve. Indeed, the relationship between output and interest rates is estimated very imprecisely and is subject to econometric difficulties that may bias estimates of the interest rate sensitivity of output downward. Nonetheless, the longevity of this puzzle makes one question why forecasters have not caught on to this mistake. Finally, it is interesting to note that many times during the past 20 years forecasters have acknowledged the formidable past performance of the yield curve in predicting expansions and recessions but argued that this past performance did not apply in the current situation. That is, signals from the yield curve have often been dismissed because of supposed changes in the economy or special factors influencing interest rates. This paper, however, shows that the puzzling power of the yield curve to predict recessions relative to that of professional forecasters appears to have endured, despite the wide dissemination of knowledge about the yield curve's predictive power. Note: The most accurate entries at each horizon are shown in boldface type. The dagger denotes yield curve forecasts that are significantly more accurate than the SPF reported forecast at the 5% level. Note: A dagger denotes coefficients that are significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Each column reports the results from a regression of the SPF real-time real GDP forecast error (assessed using first-final data) on the specified explanetory variables. The row labeled "F-test" reports the p-value associated with the test that all coefficients are jointly zero.
SPF reported recession probability forecasts SPF implied recession probability forecasts using fitted normal GDP forecast error distributions Legend:
Note: Shaded bars denote R1 recession quarters. Yield spread R1 recession probability forecasts from real-time probit regressions
Legend:
SPF reported R1 recession probability forecasts Table A1 , with a one for a recession quarter and a zero otherwise. This binary variable will be denoted as RN BER t .
Of course, as in any real-time analysis, the issue of which vintage of data to use is important.
The first three columns of Table A1 displays three data series for real GDP growth. The first series is the so-called "first-final" data which is released about three months after the end of each quarter. This is our preferred real-time measure of GDP. It incorporates a great deal of information about expenditures and is a reasonably accurate measure of GDP based on the methodology in place at the time. The second column, the numbers in parentheses, reports the latest revised estimates available as of February 2007. These data have been subject to multiple revisions and, importantly, incorporate significant changes in methodology, making comparison of real-time forecasts to revised data problematic. The third column, the numbers in square brackets, reports the "advance" data, which are released about one month after the end of the quarter. At the time of publication of these data, several important source data are still unavailable, making these estimates subject to greater measurement error than the first-final estimates.
A straightforward rule for defining recessions that works quite well is what we dub the "R1 rule," which simply defines any single quarter of negative real GDP growth as a recession quarter. The associated binary variable of recession quarters is denoted as R1 t . Columns four through six in Table A1 report the R1 data for the first-final, current vintage, and advance data, respectively. A value of one indicates that the growth rate of real GDP was negative in that quarter, otherwise the value is zero. As shown in the table, the R1 rule applied to first-final data produces 14 recession quarters that match one of the 21 NBER recession quarters, with only seven missed calls of recession. The R1 rule also produces five false calls of recession (including one by a whisker in 1978:Q1). Therefore, there are 12 total quarters of incorrect signals and the mix of missed calls is reasonably balanced. The R1 rule has advantages in terms of simplicity and its direct connection to the survey questions in the SPF and we therefore use it for our analysis for the remainder of the paper.
For comparison, we also report the recession dates that one obtains by applying what we 1 call the "R2 rule," which defines a recession as occurring if there are two consecutive quarters of negative real GDP growth. In particular, we say that a quarter is in an R2 recession if real GDP falls in that quarter and if either (or both) the previous and following quarters post negative real GDP growth as well. Columns seven through nine in Table A1 report the R2 data for the first-final, current vintage, and advance data, respectively. This definition of a recession is often mentioned in the media, but in practice, it performs rather poorly as a proxy for NBER recession dates. Using any of the three vintages of data, the R2 rule appears too stringent a criterion to provide a good match to the NBER business-cycle dating methodology. For example, applying the R2 rule to the first-final data produces only ten recession quarters that match one of the 21 NBER recession quarters, with 11 quarters of missed recession signals. Perhaps most problematic, the R2 rule using the first-final data completely misses the 1980 and 2001 NBER recessions. The R2 rule produces only two false calls of recession quarters relative to the NBER definition (in 1969 and 1991) . Overall then, the R2 rule gives a total of 13 quarters of incorrect recession signals. 
